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COMMENT
TRANSACTIONS-Description of
Collateral in a Financing Slatement. - In re Lehner, 303 F.
Supp. 317 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
COMMERCIAL

LAW-SECURED

O

N August 18, 1967, Household Finance Corporation (HFC)
made a loan to Lowell Louis Lehner of $827.33 which was
secured by a tapedeck and a portable television set. Pursuant
to the statutory requirement for perfecting security interests,
HFC duly filed a financing statement in which the secured
collateral was described only as "consumer goods." On November 6, 1967, Lehner filed a petition for voluntary bankruptcy.
HFC sought leave to foreclose on its security interest. The referee ruled the lien invalid on the ground that the term "consumer goods" did not describe the secured collateral sufficiently to perfect HFC's interest in the television set and tapedeck. On petition to the U.S. District Court (D. Colo.), held,
affirmed. The term "consumer goods" is too broad, general and
meaningless to fulfill the demand of UCC § 9-402(1) that the
financing statement describe the items secured, or at least indicate their type.'
I.

NOTICE FILING UNDER THE UCC

Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code 2 provides
three legal devices by which a security interest in personal
property may be perfected,: i.e., rendered impervious to defeat
by a trustee in insolvency proceedings 4 or unsecured creditors
in general. Of these, the most important is that of notice
filing9' Indeed, § 9-302 provides that with certain specified
exceptions, a financing statement must be filed to perfect a
security interest in personal propertyY
From a functional point of view, the filed financing statement serves to place a prospective creditor on inquiry notice
I In re Lerner, 303 F. Supp. 317, 320 (D. Colo. 169). On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the decision of the district court
was affirmed per curiam. In re Lehner, 427 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Colorado Code will be
designated "UCC" and will omit the complete statutory citation. Citation
to "Comments" are those accompanying the 1962 Official Text.
UCC §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, 9-306.
4 Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 1106
(1963); UCC § 9-301.
-- UCC § 9-302.
6 d. §9-302(1).
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that the named secured party may have a security interest in
the collateral described.' Further inquiry from the parties concerned is necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.,
To be effective, a financing statement must contain, inter
alia, "a statement indicating the types, or describing the items,
of collateral."" For the purpose of this requirement, "any
description of personal property . . . is sufficient whether or
not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described."'u
In adopting this simple and flexible test for determining the
sufficiency of a description, the Code has abandoned the highly
technical and rigid formalities that unduly burdened secured
transactions under pre-Code law.1 1 Thus the Comment to §
9-110 states that in applying this test "courts should refuse to
follow the holdings . . . that descriptions are insufficient unless
they are of the most exact and detailed nature, the so-called
'serial number' test."1 2
To date, the relatively few courts which
to pass on the sufficiency of description in
ment, have, for the most part, been willing
monition of the Code drafters. Adverting
7 Id.

have had occasion
a financing stateto follow the adto the functional

§ 9-403, Comment 2.

8 Id.

9 Id. §9-402(1).
'OId. § 9-110. It should be noted that Colorado has adopted a nonuniform
amendment to § 9-110. The Colorado version, as found in COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 155-9-110 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969), reads as

follows:

II

12

For the purposes of this article, any description of personal
property is sufficient if it specifically identifies and itemizes
in the security agreement what is described as to consumer
goods, and whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described as to all other personal property.
Thus Colorado, in the interest of consumer protection, has stifled the
Code's attempt to abolish the pre-Code formalities which required
the security agreement to contain the most detailed and particularized
description of collateral. However, as the Colorado amendment clearly
applies only to the security agreement, it seems safe to conclude that
the language of the Official Draft, as quoted in the text, still controls
the sufficiency of a description in a financing statement. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the language of the Official
Draft is reproduced in Comment 1 of § 9-402 as the proper determining test for the sufficiency of description under that section. Thus
what follows in the text applies to Colorado as well as to those states
which have adopted the uniform version of §9-110.
In Colorado, three statutes governed most transactions in personalty:
they were the Chattel Mortgage Act, the Inventory Mortgage Act, and
the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act. Each of these statutes
had its own formal requisites, differing means of perfection, and
required elaborate and precise descriptions of collateral. The history
of cases decided under such statutes is replete with examples of
ostensibly perfected security interests set aside because of failure to
comply with a minute, technical requirement of form.
UCC § 9-110, Comment.
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approach taken by the Code, they have generally permitted
the use of broad, indefinite descriptions.' 3 This trend has
been particularly noticeable in the field of inventory and accounts receivable financing, where broad descriptions of collatteral are of particular utility. Thus, a financing statement
containing the description, "all present and future accounts
receivable submitted," was held sufficient." Also, the word
"inventory" was held not to be too vague to satisfy the requirements of § 9-402(1). 15
While the floating lien and after-acquired property aspects
of inventory and accounts receivable financing make mandatory the use and judicial validation of very broad descriptions
where such financing is concerned, the same considerations are
not applicable to consumer goods financing. Nevertheless, at
least one court has refused to set a different standard of sufficiency for description of stable, as opposed to shifting, collateral. Thus it was held in In re Trumble0 that the description "consumer goods" was sufficient in a financing statement
utilized to perfect a security interest in household goods, two
rifles and a shotgun. The court in In re Trumble acknowledged
that the term "consumer goods" was possessed of broad, and
to an extent, indefinite meaning, but concluded that since it
was sufficient to do the job assigned to it, i.e., to place a prospective creditor on inquiry notice, it was also sufficient to
17
perfect the secured party's interest in the secured collateral.
Outside of Colorado, In re Trumble is the only other reported case dealing with the precise issue before the court
in the instant case.' Clearly, the two cases are irreconcilable.
In what follows an attempt will be made to show where the
Colorado court erred in not aligning itself with the decision
in In re Trumble. The gist of the discussion is that requiring
itemization in the financing statement militates against certain
In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Security Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Hlass, 246 Ark. 1084, 441 S.W.2d 91 (1969); National Cash Register v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963); Evans
Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore.362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966); Thompson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (1962).
14 Industrial Packaging Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging International,
Inc., 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
15 Thompson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (1962).
16 Bankruptcy No. 88n, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 543 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
17 Id. at 546.
18 It should be noted that in rendering its decision in In re Lehner, the
District Court was not exactly dealing with an issue of first impression
in Colorado. In re Bell, Bankruptcy No. 68-13-658, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 740
(D. Colo. 1969), the referee came to precisely the same conclusion as
the U.S. District Court with regard to the insufficiency of the term
13

"consumer goods."
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policies underlying Article Nine and does not safeguard any
interest of the consumer.
II. IN RE LEHNER

AND UNDERLYING CODE POLICIES

In reaching its decision in the instant case, the court stated
that, "I w]hile the comment [to § 9-402] states that the finaning statement is sufficient if it puts potential creditors on
inquiry notice, the statutory language of § 155-9-402 clearly
requires some specificity of description-the financing statement must indicate the type or describe the item of collateral."'" It then concluded that "It ihe use of the term 'consumer goods' fails . .. to satisfy this section. It is too broad,
general, and meaningless to fulfill the demand of § 9-402(1) that
the financing statement at least reveal the 'types.' ,.,
The court distinguished those cases holding that the requirements of § 9-402(1) are satisfied by the use of such broad
descriptions as "inventory" and "accounts receivable" on the
ground that they involved commercial rather than consumer
transactions. According to the court, those decisions were based
on "the fact of commercial policy applicable to inventory
financing which discourages the filing of new statements each
time new inventory and accounts receivable are acquired - a
consideration which is not present in an individual loan case
like the present one.121 The court here intimates, without stating, specific affirmative policy considerations in support of the
proposition that a higher degree of specificity of description
is required in the financing statement where a consumer, as
opposed to a merchant, is the recipient of a loan.
As has previously been observed, the function of the financing statement is to put potential creditors on inquiry notice
that the named secured party may have an interest in the
described collateral.22 To this end
9-402(1) provides that
"[a]

financing statement is sufficient if it . . . contains a state-

ment indicating the types, or describing the items of collateral."' ;! Inasmuch as the language quoted uses the disjunctive
or with respect to identification of the collateral, it is clear
that the financing statement would be sufficient if it contained
nothing more than an indication as to the types of collateral
secured. The question then becomes, is the term "consumer
N9303 F. Supp. 317, 318 (D.Colo. 1969).
Id. at 320.

20
21

Id.

22 UCC § 9-402, Comment 2.

23 Id.§ 9-402(1).
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goods" sufficiently descriptive of a "type" of collateral so as
to meet the requirements of . 9-402(1)?
Section 9-109 provides that "goods are: (1) 'Consumer
goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (2) 'Equipment' .
.
,24 In addition,
(3) 'Farm equipment' . . . ; (4) 'Inventory'
the Comments to § 9-109 state that:
[t]he classes of goods are mutually exclusive; the same property
cannot at the same time and as to the same person be both
equipment and inventory. In borderline cases-a physician's car
or a farmer's jeep which might be either consumer goods or
equipment-the principal use to which the property is put should
be considered as determinative. Goods can fall into different
of a
classes at different times; a radio is inventory in the hands
25
dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a householder.
This language clearly indicates that it was the intent of the
drafters that the term "consumer goods" have some functional
meaning and content. The widespread use of the Code definition of the term, especially in recently proposed consumer
oriented legislation,'2" indicates that the intent of the drafters
has not been frustrated..2 7 In light of this, it seems safe to
conclude that the term "consumer goods" does indeed represent
a type of goods for the purposes of § 9-402(1); and its use in a
financing statement would thus be sufficient to place a potential creditor on inquiry notice as to the possibility of the existence of a prior interest in any collateral reasonably within the
scope of the term. Clearly then, the financing statement filed
by HFC in the instant case was sufficient to put potential
creditors on inquiry notice as to the existence of a security
interest in Lehner's tapedeck and television set.
If the above analysis is correct and the description "consumer goods" is sufficient to place a prospective creditor on
inquiry notice, requiring any greater degree of description is
not justified unless some overriding policy consideration demands greater specificity. It is true, as the court indicated,
that inclusion of the notice filing concept, accompanied by use
of broad descriptives, was motivated by a commercial need for
24

2."

Id. § 9-109.
Id. § 9-109, Comment 2.
NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 1, 301 (68) (1970 first final draft)\, UNIFORM CONSUMIER CREDIT CODE § 3-104(1) (b) (1969 revised final draft),
and TRUTH IN LENDING ACT § 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (Supp. V, 1970).

-;Cf.
27

The court in In re Trumble, in deciding that the term "consumer goods"
was sufficiently descriptive, adverted to the widespread use of the

term in stating that it could nct "close its eyes to the fact that this
use of 'consumer goods' is now fairly common so this term must serve
some purpose." 5 U.C.C. Rep. 543, 546 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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inventory financing. " 1 However, the absence of those policy
considerations in the consumer transaction does not seem to be
an acceptable basis for differentiation; the UCC is a uniform
body of law, applicable to all classes of goods, buyers, and
sellers.*-'" While use of notice filing may have been prompted
by the needs of one segment of the commercial world, the Code
clearly makes the device available in all kinds of transactions
The question becomes, then, does requiring itemization in
the financing statement safeguard some interest of the consumer within the context of the individual loan case? It should
be noted at the outset that the Code does not totally neglect
consumers, although it is not designed primarily to protect
consumer interests. The Code draws distinctions between consumers and merchants where it is felt strict application of a
single rule would result in injustice and abuses. :'" No such distinction was included in those sections under discussion with
respect to the degree of description required in a financing
statement filed to perfect an interest in consumer goods. Also,
it should be reiterated that the principal function of notice
filing is to protect potential creditors by providing notice
of the existence of a prior security interest in the debtor's
property.
A possible argument in support of itemization is that consumers should b? aware of the extent to which their personalty
is encumbered. Of course, the extent of a security interest is
not controlled by the financing statement no matter how broad
the description, but by the security agreement. :" The UCC,
as enacted in Colorado, requires itemization in the security
argeement where an interest is taken in consumer goods.:2'-' If
the debtor is not aware of those items of his personalty subject to a lien, reference to the security agreement is possible. : :
In addition, the UCC provides means whereby a debtor may
4
force a creditor to disclose the extent of the secured property.:3
2S

UCC § 9-402, Comment 2.

"

1.

GILMORE.

SECURITY

INTERESTS

IN

PERSONAL

PROPERTY

§ 15.3

(1965).

3"UCC § 2-104, Comment 1.
:11
Id. § 9-203.
32 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-9-110 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
33FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (5) (1970) requires a "clear identi-

fication" of property on the disclosure statement in which a creditor
retains or acquires a security interest arising from a consumer credit
transaction. Although this provision was not applicable to the transaction
involved herein, promulgation of Reg. Sec. 226.8 would appear to weaken

arguments for future application of the rule in the instant case. If
disclosure of the extent of a security interest is required as an incident
of a transaction, there would seem to be little reason for continuing to
distort the function of the financing statement by requiring itemization.
34 UCC § 9-208.
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A more serious argument for requiring a higher degree of
descriptive specificity with respect to consumer goods concerns
monopolization of a particular debtor's credit by "first filing"
"5
creditors. Under the "first-to-file" rule of the Code, where
both security interests are perfected by filing, priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral is determined by the order of filing, regardless of when the interests
attached. A security interest may, under § 9-203(1), be perfected by a filing previous to attachment, although the interest
is not perfected until attachment., 6 Therefore, where a prior
security interest is perfected by filing a financing statement
utilizing a broad description, the single filing is sufficient to
perfect any later attaching security interests in property
covered by that description. And such interests have priority
under the first-to-file rule over security interests which may
have attached earlier in point of time. There is nothing to
prevent a second secured creditor from having his security
interest subordinated to a later attaching security interest in
the same property which was perfected by an earlier filing.
It is argued that a debtor, faced with financial difficulties, may
be tempted to borrow from creditor A, securing the loan with
an item of personalty in which creditor B has a security
interest. Under the provisions discussed above, if a debtor has
previously engaged in secured transactions with A, who in
perfecting his interests utilized a descriptive statement broad
enough to include the item in which B has an interest, A's
interest will have priority. Therefore, a subsequent creditor
may be hesitant to extend credit to a debtor where previous
creditors have filed statements describing collateral in such
terms as "consumer goods."
This problem would not seem to pose as great a difficulty
when the former debts are not outstanding. Under the UCC
a debtor may compel a creditor to file a termination statement when the debt has been settled.3 7 Where the loan is
still outstanding, it is conceivable that the first-to-file rule
would inhibit extension of credit by subsequent sources in the
manner described. However, there is no empirical evidence
indicating that monopolization of a debtor's business is a "real"
problem; certainly, none was introduced in the instant case
to support a conclusion that consumers are experiencing dif:5 Id. § 9-312(5) (a).
36 Id. § 9-203(1).
37 Id. § 9-404.
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ficulty in obtaining credit from multiple sources because of
broad descriptions in financing statements.3s
Use of descriptions otherwise satisfying the requirements
of § 9-402(1) should not be denied, absent a showing that
requiring itemization in financing statements facilitates extension of consumer credit. Indeed, it is arguable that, even if
monopolization of a consumer's credit were a real problem,
this would not be sufficient grounds to require itemization. As
Gilmore has noted, the same result could be obtained by a
carefully drawn financing statement in which the collateral
was described in the most specific terms.:"' Requiring itemization would not alleviate any burden upon the consumer which
could not be imposed through some other legitimate application of Code provisions.
CONCLUSION

The ruling in In re Lehner denied use of a descriptive
statement which appears to satisfy the requirement of § 9-402
that a description merely place a prospective creditor on inquiry notice. In requiring itemization in the financing statement, the court has misconstrued the function of the financing statement, denied use of common commercial parlance,
dysfunctionally segmented varieties of commercial transactions, and introduced a needless technicality. Clearly this
decision is antagonistic to the underlying Article Nine policies
38

3

Information imparted by local counsel associated with the small loan
industry indicates that the first-to-file rule does not in fact deter

subsequent creditors from making loans to debtors who have entered
into a prior secured transaction perfected by a financing statement
containing a broad description of collateral. As a general rule, consumer
finance companies require collateral in order to acquire "leverage" in
the debt collection process, not to provide a pool of assets from which,
upon default, a debt may be recouped. In addition, many of the loans
granted by consumer finance companies are debt consolidation loans.
Once the -funds advanced have been used to liquidate outstanding
debts, the debtor is requested to require prior creditors to file termination statements, cancelling financing statements by which a prior indebtedness was perfected.
Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article Nine, 47 N.B. L. REV.
659, 672 (1968). By way of illustration, local finance companies typically
file a notice containing a descriptive statement which is aptly referred
to as a "shotgun" financing statement. The statement describing the
collateral consists of an exhaustive enumeration of specific items of
consumer goods. These notices are used even though a present security
interest is not taken in every item listed. Apparently, such shotgun
financing statements have found favor with the local bankruptcy
courts, as no reported cases have been discovered denying their use.
Local counsel indicate that the "shotgun" financing statement has
been tacitly approved on the ground that the UCC permits use of a
single financing statement to perfect a security interest in personalty
described therein attaching subsequent to a filing. In effect, it is
permissable to set forth in the financing statement property which
may be subject to future security agreements as well as property
subject to a present security agreement. See UCC § 9-402(1), 9-303(1).

154
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of functionalism and simplicity. This effect cannot be justified
in terms of protecting some interest of the consumer. In fact,
it would seem as if the only party who benefits by requiring
itemization in the financing statement under Colorado law is
the trustee in bankruptcy. The voided security interest is
preserved for the benefit of the estate-the bankrupt's exemption under state law only attaches to his equity in the property.
The instant decision effects a return to the state of affairs
existing under prior security law; legitimate security interests
are rendered susceptible to attack by a voracious trustee for
failure to comply with a legal technicality serving no function.
It is to be hoped that other jurisdictions look before imitating
this misguided leap upon the consumer bandwagon.

